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In Pragmatism as Transition, Colin Koopman argues for a vision of pragmatism 
that is at once old and new, seeking to overcome the divide between classicopragma-
tism and neo-pragmatism through a vision of pragmatism whose central feature is 
“transitionalism.” Transitionalism, for Koopman, is a thoroughly historicist outlook 
that is present in all forms of pragmatism, even if not as well thematized as it might 
have been. On his reading, then, “pragmatism’s most important philosophical con-
tribution is that of redescribing the philosophical practices of thought, critique, and 
inquiry such that these practices take place in time and through history.”1 Adopting 
such an historicist outlook on the development of pragmatism enables Koopman 
to navigate the fraught relationship between the pragmatisms of James, Dewey and 
Rorty, drawing on what is best in each while rejecting the old shibboleths of their 
respective defenders—“experience” and “language,” respectively.
Transitionalism, for Koopman, is characterized not only by attention to the 
historicity of our philosophical practices, but just as importantly, by a commitment 
to meliorist cultural critique. Thus, the temporality of Koopman’s vision of prag-
matism is purposively multidirectional: the truly engaged cultural critic is not a 
utopian, but “stand[s] against some specific historical reality in the name of some 
specifiably better, and actually possible, historical reality.”2 The philosophical out-
look Koopman advocates is thus, in many ways, standard for pragmatists (though it 
does, importantly, explicitly exclude the work of Peirce from the realm of exemplary 
pragmatism, as Peirce was “simply not invested in the project of cultural critique,”3 
even if some of his followers have attempted to formulate moral and political theo-
ries on the basis of Peircean epistemology). And yet, the particulars of Koopman’s 
cashing-out of “pragmatism as transition” make for a reconstruction of pragmatism 
that many pragmatists, particularly Deweyans, will find surprising and challenging.
Koopman begins pointing to transitionalist themes in the history of pragma-
tism in chapter 2, but the core of the argument—and the most impressive argument 
of the book—is in chapter 3, where Koopman argues for what he calls a “third wave 
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of pragmatism”4 that follows on the first wave of classicopragmatism (exemplified by 
James and Dewey’s emphasis on experience) and the second wave of neo-pragmatism 
(exemplified by Rorty’s emphasis on language) in such a way that it “cumulatively 
washes in upon the other two waves rather than disaccumulatively draining them 
away.”5 This wave metaphor is important, for readers should not make the mistake 
of thinking that Koopman comes only to initiate hand-holding and reconciliation: 
his transitionalist pragmatism, while emerging from waters clearly shared by James, 
Dewey and Rorty, comes crashing in upon all three in this chapter, and Koopman 
argues forcefully that we contemporary pragmatists ought to be swept along, too. 
The crux of Koopman’s argument for transitionalism is epistemological: 
despite their varying emphases, the classicopragmatists and the neo-pragmatists 
are ultimately united by the inadequacy of their attempts to circumvent the prob-
lems of modern, foundationalist, representationalist epistemology, which Sellars 
famously described as “givenism.”6 Though classical pragmatists were eager to 
distance themselves from the modernist epistemological project, Koopman ar-
gues that appeals to the immediacy of experience show up repeatedly in the work 
of Dewey and James (and in their readers) in ways that appear to be “dangerously 
near to foundationalism.”7 The issue, for Koopman, is not merely that Dewey (for 
example) posited the existence of a raw, immediate, given experience, but that he 
“expended enormous energy precisely specifying the havings of primary experi-
ence in his epistemology and ethics,”8 which suggests that they are carrying sig-
nificant epistemic weight, and indeed, that they function as covert foundations. 
Rorty and Brandom, of course, attempt to avoid the pitfalls of foundationalism by 
fully embracing the linguistic turn. This strategy, while wildly divergent from clas-
sicopragmatism and partially on target (insofar as it takes seriously the mediation 
of experience), serves pragmatism no better in Koopman’s view. For, in reducing 
knowledge to instances of linguistic justification, Rorty and Brandom commit 
themselves to an impoverished notion of knowledge that is unable to account for 
the practical knowledge of “skills, performances, and technologies” that is not re-
ducible to language or propositional content.9 Thus, although classical pragmatists 
were right to suggest that we must begin our inquiries and practices of cultural 
critique with the experiences in which we find ourselves, and neo-pragmatists were 
right to rejoin that those experiences, as mediated, could not serve as foundational 
grounds of inquiry, a thoroughly historicist, transitionalist pragmatism must not 
take either of these approaches on entirely. 
Instead, Koopman insists that we take a transitionalist view, in which knowl-
edge is a “relation . . . between prior practical projections (for example, beliefs, skills) 
and the future practical eventualities at which they aim (for example, the objects of 
beliefs, the aims of skillful action)”10 that can be analyzed in a variety of ways, but 
which is always about “the process of getting from here to there”11—where “here” 
is always itself a product of an historical process.
Book rEviEw    97
Volume 30 (1) 2014
This revisioning of knowledge (in chapter 4) is the first of three chapters in 
which Koopman offers an affirmative account of the particulars of his vision of prag-
matism. These three chapters deal, respectively, with knowledge, ethics, and politics, 
and aim to explain the ways in which transitionalist pragmatism cashes out in each 
of these philosophical areas. Interestingly, Koopman chooses to articulate his ac-
counts of knowledge, ethics, and politics almost entirely meta-theoretically, and in 
relation to wider debates in philosophy beyond pragmatism. The meta-theoretical 
character of the book is intentional, and Koopman declares these intentions as early 
as the Introduction, acknowledging the irony of a book that celebrates cultural criti-
cism despite not engaging in it.12 Such sustained attention to methodology might be 
surprising to some pragmatists, but it is a reasonable philosophical choice, particu-
larly given Koopman’s interest in articulating an approach to pragmatic inquiry that 
distinguishes itself from—even while drawing on—James, Dewey and Rorty. 
And yet, it seems to me that Koopman’s meta-theoretical or methodological 
points might have been strengthened through sustained attention to examples of tran-
sitionalist cultural critique, even if he did not construct such critiques himself. In his 
chapter on knowledge, for example, Koopman suggests that his transitionalism is clos-
est to James’s approach to knowledge, for he agrees that “if one experience satisfactorily 
leads us to another, then that satisfactory relation . . . sufficiently explains knowledge,”13 
despite the fact that “James’s epistemology was subject to all of the deficits and defects 
rehearsed”14 in Koopman’s third chapter. The upshot of this tension is, simply, that 
“we should play up . . . emphatic invocations of temporality and historicity featured 
in the epistemology of [James, Dewey] and other pragmatists so as to overcome some 
of the persisting deficits that continue to plague pragmatism.”15 Such an emphasis on 
historicity is one to which I suspect many pragmatists would be amenable, so it would 
be helpful to hear more from Koopman about what “play[ing] up” temporality and 
historicity would entail in a concrete example, and how, if at all, it is different from 
the epistemological approach taken by Dewey, Rorty, or James himself. It is one thing, 
in other words, to talk about emphasizing the historical character of knowledge; it is 
another to show that this emphasis is the sort of difference that makes a difference.
Similarly, in his fifth chapter on ethics, although Koopman suggests that there 
is a problem with a Deweyan “experience-centric”16 approach to pragmatic ethics, 
the practical implications of his own account could be further developed. Koop-
man turns here to James, following him in suggesting that moral action is primarily 
about the “effort of attention” that aims at “continuity of growth”17—what pragma-
tists will recognize as James’s “strenuous mood,” in which “we start from where we 
are and develop the resources within our situation . . . to improve it.”18 Koopman’s 
emphasis is again on temporal development, and his aim in this particular context 
is to provide a pragmatic, transitionalist re-reading of Cavell’s perfectionist ethics. 
Still, questions remain about what is to be gained from a specifically Jamesian ethic 
over (say) a Deweyan or Rortyan one, or what such “efforts of attention” might re-
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quire in practice as distinct from an “experience-centric” ethic. The difficulty, here 
as in the knowledge chapter, is that because the conditions for the possibility of 
knowledge, or of ethical action, cannot be determined in advance—as Koopman 
and other pragmatists would agree—attempts to describe the practices involved in 
the production or attainment of knowledge or moral action in general, rather than 
specific instances of them, will inevitably be problematic. 
Koopman’s does contrast his normative claims with others, though this dis-
tinction focuses less on other forms of pragmatism than on wider debates within 
ethical and political philosophy. Koopman positions his pragmatic perfectionist 
ethics, for example, as a third alternative to utilitarianism and deontology more 
attuned to modern problems than the typical third alternative of the return to an-
cient virtue ethics.19 Likewise, although Koopman’s sixth chapter on politics in the 
end offers an interesting argument for rethinking democracy in a way that draws 
on and diverges from both contemporary deliberative democrats and Dewey’s 
democracy-as-experience, much of the chapter is taken up with a description of 
pragmatism’s intervention into contemporary political philosophy more broadly 
construed. His ultimate suggestion, that viewing democracy “as a transitional 
practice” will enable us “to refine, sharpen, and deploy the valuable tools of demo-
cratic deliberation and democratic experience already featured in existing works 
of pragmatist political philosophy”20 is an exciting and provocative one, as is his 
urging of pragmatists to move beyond the Deweyan romanticization of the local 
community, which he rightly points out is unable to grapple with the “plurality of 
polities”21 of contemporary globalization and the urban metropolis. These ethical 
and political claims are worth further unpacking, perhaps using concrete examples 
of what viewing democracy as a transitional practice entails.
Koopman offers a more concrete suggestion about what steps transitionalist 
pragmatism would require in the final chapter, where he argues that a historicist 
approach to cultural critique would benefit from incorporating the genealogical 
method of Foucault. Foucault’s work is particularly useful for, as Koopman puts 
it, helping us to “be on the lookout for ways in which our own best practices are 
already rife with problems that we hardly suspect.”22 Past pragmatisms, for Koop-
man, have not had good mechanisms in place to make us aware of our own limita-
tions. Dewey, for example, “was simply too confident that ‘problems will abundantly 
present themselves.’”23 While pragmatists like Dewey tend to be very good at think-
ing about ways to seek out improvements to our current situations, Foucaultian 
genealogy—possibly in addition to critical philosophies like feminism, critical 
race theory and queer theory24—are necessary additions, if we are to adequately 
conceptualize the problems of those current situations, particularly when they are 
non-transparent to us. Thus, Koopman concludes, transitionalist pragmatism re-
quires genealogy as a diagnostic tool,25 as the first step in a robust meliorism that 
truly seeks to help us move from “here” to “there.”
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This final point is very well made, and at adds an important detail to Koop-
man’s picture of pragmatism as transition. Combining this insight on the role of 
genealogy and critical philosophy with his chapters on knowledge, ethics and poli-
tics raises important questions for the future of transitionalist pragmatism. How, 
for example, might attending to feminist insights change the way we conceive the 
“we” of the deliberative democratic community, or what it means for a problematic 
situation to be improved? Does doing adequately pragmatist (which is to say, tran-
sitionalist) work require that we also be well versed in feminism, genealogy, queer 
theory, Marxism, or critical philosophy of race? These are questions that hover in 
the background for Koopman in the final chapter; it will be exciting to see how he 
takes them up in new work.
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